This paper examines R&D tax incentives in oligopolistic markets. It is generally agreed that R&D has some characteristics of a public good. Therefore, the market will fail to provide a sufficient amount of R&D.
Introduction
Economic development in a growing number of countries has been dependent on R&D driven technologies. An increasing number of countries are offering special fiscal incentives to businesses to induce spending on R&D and increase their level of innovation. This is mostly because R&D and in the more general sense innovation are considered the key to productivity increases and high growth performance. In addition, it is also known that R&D investment plays a crucial role in international competitiveness.
In their seminal works, Solow (1957) , and Denison (1974) showed that a significant portion of US productivity increase comes from technological change. Empirical analysis by the OECD (2001) affirms that R&D increases multi-factor productivity. Gravelle (1999) estimated that the US R&D tax credit cost around $ 2.24 billion in lost revenue over fiscal years 1997 through 2002. A survey of the European Commission (1995) on state aid reports that its members spent over $ 1 billion per annum on R&D tax incentives during the early 1990's. In Canada, due to R&D tax incentives, the after-tax cost of R&D expenditure ranges between 35 and 50 cents per dollar spent depending on the type of firm and the province in which the R&D activity is conducted. In many other major countries' governments are trying to stimulate and encourage the creation of new technical knowledge. These are just a few examples that show how R&D tax incentives are becoming more and more important 1 . They show that public policy towards R&D has become extremely important.
Everyone agrees that we should create more incentives to increase R&D activities. However, this paper shows that it is not a per se rule that socially desirable level of R&D investment can be reached by imposing a tax credit.
From the theoretical point of view, it is usually believed that R&D investment has some characteristics of a public good. Therefore, it can be considered partially nonexcludable and nonrivalrous (See Arrow (1962) , and Romer (1990) ). It is partially nonexcludable because no one has the ability to exclude others from taking advantage of it, unless there is absolute intellectual property protection 2 .
It is nonrivalrous since it does not wear out or suffer from congestion. Hence, we expect the output of R&D investment to have the properties of a public good. The only difference is that it is mostly 1 See Hall (1993 Hall ( , 1995 for a review of some of the history, regulations and methodology related to tax credits in the US and other OECD countries.
2 E.g., via patents with no knowledge spillovers within and across the industries.
produced privately.
Given this evidence, we should consider some incentive mechanisms to induce R&D investment.
There is no controversy over the intervention of government into the R&D businesses and government's role in encouraging appropriate R&D activity levels. Depending on country specific circumstances, R&D tax incentives can be a very effective tool for increasing the level of firm financed R&D activities 3 . The incentives used to encourage R&D vary across OECD countries: Finland and Sweden neither subsidize nor extend preferential tax treatment to privately financed R&D, but they still have a considerable amount of private R&D activity. New Zealand prefers R&D subsidies over tax treatment to stimulate research for particular goals and avoid jeopardizing the neutrality of the tax system. The US, UK and France use a combination of subsidies and tax incentives to stimulate privately financed R&D investments.
There has been a lot controversy over the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives. Some earlier studies, mostly by Mansfield, claim that R&D tax incentives were more a burden than a stimulator. Mansfield (1986) found that R&D is not very sensitive to changes in its after-the-tax price. We know that different empirical approaches produce different results. Regression estimates using time series data show considerable effects of R&D credits on R&D spending whereas some indirect measures, such as the ones based on the price elasticity of demand for R&D, yield more modest results. More recent studies, including Hall (1993) , found that the price elasticity is at least unity. In a related vein, Dagenais et al. (1998) , and Bernstein (1986 Bernstein ( , 1998 ) studied Canadian R&D. Asmussen and Berriot (1993) studied France and the Australian Bureau of Industry Economics (1999) studied Australia. All of these studies tend to find elasticities for price larger than one, meaning that R&D tax incentives are indeed working 4 .
In this paper we set up a simple game theoretic model to characterize the conditions under which tax incentives can induce the socially desirable level of privately-financed R&D. Then, the direct optimum, the optimum of a welfare maximizing social planner, is derived to show the analytics.
In the first stage of the game, the government commits to its optimal tax/subsidy policy towards output and R&D investment. In the second stage, firms decide how much to spend on R&D. In the 3 The US government has been using many other methods including providing lengthy patent protection through which the property rights of the innovators have been strengthened, allowing joint R&D projects and joint R&D ventures, and investing directly in R&D through companies, universities or public nonprofit organizations. 4 See Hall and Van Reenen (1999) for a survey of the empirical analysis of the R&D tax incentives.
final stage, they decide how much to sell in an oligopolistic market. We allow for the possibility of imperfect appropriability in the form of inter-firm spillovers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the model. Section 3 characterizes the R&D investment for a regulated oligopoly. Section 4 discusses the welfare issues in the decentralized equilibrium. The direct optimum is also given here. Section 5 concludes and summarizes the paper.
Section 6 is an appendix that contains some detailed derivations and proofs.
The Model
We set up a three-stage game theoretic model in which we have a representative consumer, n firms, and a social utility maximizing government. We assume an oligopolistic market in which firms engage in output competition à la Cournot. Therefore, we immediately expect there will be under production due to market power. We also assume that technical knowledge disperses within the sector imperfectly.
Consumers
Following Dixit (1979) , we assume there is a representative consumer whose preferences are given by a money metric utility function which is additively separable and linear in the numeraire good m.
where Q is the total demand of the representative consumer for output. With this functional form, we have no income effects and therefore the discussion boils down to a partial equilibrium analysis.
Suppose the utility from the total output is quadratic and takes the following form
From the maximization problem of the representative consumer we get the linear inverse demand function:
where p is the price of the good 5 .
Firms
Consider an oligopolistic industry that consists of n symmetric firms indexed by i. The firm produce a single homogeneous good. When they do not engage in R&D activities the marginal cost of production is constant and equal to c. We will call this the initial marginal cost. When they engage in R&D activities, the marginal cost of production decreases. In accord with D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we assume R&D investments have a cost reducing behavior. A quality-enhancing behavior can also be assumed in a product differentiation model. In market economies, the level of cost reducing R&D is determined by profits. Since profits may understate the social benefits at the margin, there is no reason to believe ex ante that the market outcome is optimal. For various reasons 6 , we assume that the rival firms' R&D expenditures also reduce the firm's marginal cost, but by less than the firm's own R&D investment. In the model, this effect is captured by a technical knowledge spillover α within the industry. On one hand, spillovers reduce costs. On the other hand, they decrease the incentive for new R&D investment. We assume that the marginal cost function is the same form for all firms, and takes the following convex form for firm i:
where I i represents the R&D expenditure level of the firm i and I −i for all other firms. Φ i is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable in I i and I −i . Asymmetric information in technical knowledge and imperfect competition in the output market result in gaps in R&D investments. Since we have spillovers within the sector, any industrial knowledge rapidly becomes a public good. This prevents firms from enjoying all the benefits of their own R&D investments. One functional form which captures this effect for firm i can be
With n firms, inverse demand function can be rewritten as follows:
which is a linear and therefore concave demand function. The convex form for marginal cost and concave form for the demand function assures the concavity of the profit function and hence the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium. We assume that R&D represents a cost that depends on the efficiency of the R&D activities. This has effects on marginal cost and allocative efficiency 8 .
Some amount of subsidy is given for every dollar spent on R&D and output is taxed. The profit function for firm i is then given by
where t is the tax on output, s is the subsidy on R&D, and Ψ(I i ) is the cost of R&D activities which is a function of R&D investment. Initially, we define t < p(q i , q i ) and s ∈ [0, 1], but we shall relax these assumptions without loss of any generality whenever an optimum occurs with a negative tax (a subsidy on output) or with a negative subsidy (a tax on R&D).
R&D investment might be considered the most important source of product differentiation in determining whether firms can earn excess profits. Moreover, since R&D investment is costly, it is going to be a very good way to deter entry. If a new entrant wants to compete effectively with the incumbents, it has to bear high R&D costs which makes it difficult to enter that market. Therefore, in the R&D driven sectors we expect to see higher concentration ratios. Our model is, by no means, a product differentiation model, but it captures the latter effect. Moreover, we look at the sectors in 7 This is also the average cost of production. For future purposes, marginal cost can also be written as (Φ i + t)where ε is defined to be price elasticity
). Therefore price is a markup over after-tax marginal cost. This is similar to the mark-up that can be derived from a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type product differentiation model. As indicated by Spence (1984) , what is more in R&D than product differentiation is the appropriability problem or in general an externality problem.
which a substantial amount of production cost is affected by R&D investments. Markets are usually oligopolistic in such sectors. That is why we prefer to use an oligopoly model in this paper.
The Government
We are treating the government as an active player with full commitment powers to set the available policy tools. The government chooses the optimal policy mix (t, s) so as to maximize its social welfare function, which is to be defined later. Optimal policy comprises an R&D subsidy s to deal with R&D market failure and an output tax t to deal with market power in the output market.
Market incentives are not enough to produce an optimal amount of R&D activity. As with any investment decision, R&D investment is not undertaken by firms unless it is profitable. Moreover, they sometimes over-invests due to the strategic reasons. It makes governments intervention crucial for optimality. By changing the relative cost of R&D to any other investment through the optimal tax/subsidy policy towards R&D, the government can influence the generation of technical knowledge for economic growth in the second best sense. It is an effective tool to internalize the spillover effects. Moreover, if possible, the government can use another tax/subsidy policy towards market power. These two policies addressing two market failures are sufficient to bring the economy to its first best frontier. Thus, a decentralized equilibrium with tax/subsidy policies by the government exactly matches with the optimum of a welfare maximizing social planner.
The Game
We are considering a three stage game in which the firms and the government interact strategically.
Strategic interaction of the firms tends to reduce the output, which makes subsidies justifiable. We have infinite continuous choice spaces in all stages of the game. In the first stage, the government decides on the linear tax/subsidy rate on the output and the tax/subsidy for R&D investment. Both together form the optimal policy mix (t, s).
In the second stage, firms decide their R&D investment level. When firms act strategically by choosing R&D before they set their output level, they have a stronger incentive to invest more in R&D. By doing so they gain a stronger competitive advantage over their rivals. However, spillover effects smoothens this incentive.
In the final stage, firms decide how much to sell in the oligopolistic market by engaging in Cournot competition. Taking the technology as given, there will be under production relative to the social optimum due to the imperfect competition in the absence of an optimal policy mix (t, s). Moreover, when spillovers are high enough, we expect firms to underinvest in R&D in an unregulated market equilibrium. Spillovers are decreasing the marginal costs of the firms. Thus, they have positive effects on production.
We assume that each firm and the government knows how its actions will change the actions of all the others in the next stages of the game, which requires subgame perfection. Moreover, for the sake of completeness, it is worth mentioning that our solution concept is backward induction. Assume n is fixed, for example because of entry and exit barriers. Therefore, we can treat the number of firms as a parameter.
Characterization of R&D Investment in a Regulated Oligopoly
The maximization problem of the firm i yields the reaction functions for the Cournot outputs 9 :
We can get the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the stage-game by solving these reaction functions simultaneously:
Details are given in the appendix. By substituting (9) into the profit function (7) we get the profit function in the compact format:
9 All the conditions guaranteeing nonnegativity are assumed from now on. In particular a > Φ i > 0.
The first order conditions for the second stage of the game are then,
Therefore, the marginal benefit of R&D for firm i is 2b
Observation 1:
In an oligopolistic market with technology spillovers, a firm's marginal benefit of R&D investment can be decomposed as follows.
inverse of research intensity (12) Derivation of Observation 1 is given in the appendix. Here, η Φi:Ij is the elasticity of the marginal cost of firm i with respect to the R&D investment of firm j and M is a mark-up. I i /q i is the R&D investment per unit of output which is told to be the research intensity (RI). The change in the marginal cost of production can be interpreted as the change in the production technology of the firm (Total Technology Change, T T C). As shown in (12) , this technology change comes from two sources. First, the firm's investment in R&D decreases its own cost of production. This own effect is captured by the second term in the big parenthesis. Second, there is an external effect for the firm coming from its rivals. It is impossible for a firm to contribute only to its own technological accumulation without contributing to the others' because of the spillovers involved. Remember that in Cournot setting, relative technology change is more important than absolute technology change since all the firms are interacting strategically. Any technology investment creates a change in the technology of the other firms which is captured by the first term in the big parenthesis. We cannot say anything about the sign of this inter-firm effect unless we know the nature of the sector, especially the spillovers associated with technological improvements. Therefore, the positive externality for the other firms might have a negative feedback effect on the firm itself. However, intuitively, the positive externality is more likely to have a positive effect on the firm itself when there is high technological transmission in the sector. We shall pin down this result more in Proposition 1.
To be able to go further let's assume that the cost of R&D investment is given by
which means that there are diminishing returns to R&D. The parameter γ captures the efficiency of R&D activities 10 , and 1/γ can be interpreted as the cost effectiveness of R&D. The bigger the cost effectiveness, the better. Since there are n symmetric firms with the same cost effectiveness parameter, n/γ is an indicator of aggregate sectoral cost effectiveness. After the steps given in the appendix, we can get the R&D spending of the firm given the R&D spending of the other firms. In other words, the reaction function for R&D expenditure is
investments are strategic substitutes.
The proof is obvious. Therefore, if there is high technological transmission (meaning α > 0.5; e.g.,
there is no strong protection on intellectual property rights) within the industry, firms enjoy the R&D investments of the other firms. In other words, the R&D investments of the other firms are supporting the equilibrium level of R&D investment of the firm in consideration. If there are low spillovers (meaning α < 0.5), the technical information diffuses less, then the R&D investment of the other firms have negative effects on the firm's strategic choice of R&D investments 11 . Since the firms are all the same, the stage Nash equilibrium of the second stage of the game is given by
This is the locally stable symmetric R&D profile. Here, the denominator is positive because of a local stability condition 12 . One immediate implication of (15) is that whether the equilibrium level of R&D in the regulated oligopoly is less or greater than its unregulated market equilibrium depends mainly on the number of firms in the industry. 10 This specification comes from Cheng (1984) . 11 The concept of strategic substitutes and complements comes originally from Bulow et al. (1985) . 12 A short discussion on the derivation of the stability condition is given in the Appendix.
Welfare Implications
In this section, we present the welfare implications not only of the decentralized equilibrium but also of a direct optimum in which a benevolent social planner can plan directly both the production and R&D levels. We show that, with the two policy tools, the decentralized equilibrium achieves the first-best equilibrium levels of output and R&D of the direct optimum. Therefore, in our model, the government's policy is nothing but a strategic commitment to ensure that the decentralized equilibrium achieves the social optimum.
Decentralized Equilibrium
In the decentralized case, the government can change the equilibrium levels indirectly via its taxsubsidy policies. Assume that the government maximizes a social welfare function of the standard type in which the tax revenue is redistributed 13 .
So, the social welfare function is the sum of the surplus of the representative consumer and industry profits (which is the total revenue from output sold minus the total cost of R&D and total cost of production). After substituting for the utility function and imposing symmetry across the firms, social welfare is
The maximization of (17) gives us the following optimal policy mix for the government.
The optimal tax/subsidy for R&D equates the marginal social return to R&D to its marginal cost, and the marginal social return to output to its marginal cost. 13 Remember we have an additively separable, money metric utility function.
Therefore, a committed government would announce the (t * , s * ) social policy scheme. It is worth mentioning that the optimal subsidy to R&D investment is independent of a, b, c, γ. That is, the optimal subsidy is independent of demand characteristics, the initial marginal cost, and the cost effectiveness of R&D. It depends only on the spillover parameter and number of firms in the industry.
As can be seen from (18), given the number of firms in the sector, the degree of spillovers dictates the degree of government intervention via tax and subsidy policies. By substituting the optimal policy values into the social welfare function we get
Proposition 2 The government subsidizes R&D investment iff the sector spillover is greater than The proof is given in the appendix. Subsidizing R&D is quite intuitive. However, the interesting point is that, given a fixed number of firms in the industry, the government might want to tax R&D in the decentralized equilibrium if the spillover parameter within the industry is sufficiently low. The intuition is the following. Assume for the moment that there are no spillovers to be able to focus on only the strategic effect. In that case, as shown in Figure 1 , it is optimal to tax R&D investment for any number of firms in the industry. The motivation for a firm is to decrease its production cost by investing in R&D and therefore to increase its competitiveness.However, we do have nonzero spillovers. As was mentioned before, the government's motivation for subsidizing R&D is to make use of the positive externality of the spillovers. If they are sufficiently high, it is optimal for firms to under invest in R&D due to the very well known externality story. The more R&D a single firm is engaged in, the more the sector benefits via spillover effects. Figure 2 indicates that if the number of firms increases in the market, the taxation of R&D is optimum only with very low spillover levels. However, it is plausible to assume that spillovers in many industries cannot be very low (See, for example, Mansfield, 1985 Mansfield, , 1992 . High performance of the market occurs when we have optimal subsidies associated with high spillovers or when we have optimal taxes associated with low spillovers. Combining this evidence with Figure 1 and Figure 2, we conclude that an R&D tax is more likely to happen when there are a few firms in the industry.
One point to mention is that this result exists even if we use a general demand function instead of a linear demand function. It is because that a linear demand function is a subset of a general demand function. Therefore, an R&D tax result holds even if we were using a general demand function.
Proposition 3 The government subsidizes output ∀α ∈ [0, 1].
The proof is again in the appendix and it directly follows from the comparison of the decentralized equilibrium with the socially desirable level of output. Output is subsidized in our model to offset the underproduction due to market power. Since firms are acting in an oligopolistic market, they have market power, which lowers social welfare both at the margin and in the aggregate. Firms are producing too little output and this is bad for the surplus of the representative consumer. By subsidizing output, the government not only makes the firms better off or at least no worse off, but it also increases the output provided to the consumer, both of which generate a welfare improvement.
It is, indeed, always socially optimal to give a subsidy to output to close the gap between the marginal cost of production and the price of output.
One might argue that giving an output subsidy to the oligopolistic firms seems odd since it is increasing their profits but these profits too are taxed. Governments tax firms commonly to raise general revenue. They use some of this to finance public infrastructure and to enforce contracts via courts. . . etc., which help firms. Thus, a subsidy in a partial equilibrium model can be viewed as a lower tax in a general equilibrium context. One analogy can be the existence of both export subsidies and tariffs 14 . Moreover, even in a second best world where output cannot be subsidized we do have a positive threshold for spillover level under which R&D should be taxed 15 .
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game is the following R&D and output profiles
where the second order condition requires bnγ
Proposition 4 The government's optimal policy scheme (t * , s * ) works iff the number of firms in the market is less than bγ.
The proof is in the appendix. In mathematical terms, Proposition 4 says that n < bγ where is the 1/γ cost effectiveness of one firm, and b is the output sensitivity of demand (dp(Q)/dQ). The right hand side of this inequality depends on parameters which cannot be changed immediately. Demand characteristics remain the same unless there is a shock, and so does the cost effectiveness of R&D.
14 I thank Richard Arnott for pointing out this point. 15 A brief discussion of the second-best is given in the appendix.
That is, the optimal policy scheme works only if the sector is reasonably concentrated.
When the government commits to an optimal policy scheme (t * , s * ), it assumes that the number of firms in the market will be no more than bγ. Spence (1984) finds that incentives for R&D rise and then fall as concentration declines. That means the optimal policy scheme of the government works if there is a natural ceiling for the number of firms in the industry. However, as long as there are positive profits, the number of firms in the industry increases. The government should commit to another optimal policy scheme, if the number of firms in the industry changes. We know that frequently changing the tax-subsidy policy is not often practical. Therefore, the optimal policy scheme (t * , s * ) works only if there are barriers to deter entry. This can be a barrier which comes from the nature of the industry (e.g. entry requires a huge investment) or if the government imposes some regulations for the firms in the industry (e.g. all the entrants must satisfy the environmental regulations which requires a high-tech recycling center ). Otherwise the optimal strategy for the firms is not to invest in R&D and not to produce.
Do we have such a barrier to entry in our model? The answer is indeed "yes". In our model we have a built-in barrier to entry, the cost of R&D investment. Spence (1984) finds that reasonably concentrated industries, which are erected automatically by the high cost of R&D, with a high level of appropriability, will produce the best feasible results. Therefore, the need for a natural ceiling for the number of firms is also in accord with Spence (1984).
Direct Optimum
As a benchmark, consider the first-best social planner optimum. Assume there is a benevolent social planner who has direct control over both the output produced and the R&D investment. The social welfare function of the planner takes the same form as before, but since he has direct control over output and R&D, his choice variables are now the R&D investment profile I = (I 1 , I 2 , ..., I n ), and the output profile q = (q 1 , q 2 , ..., q n ).
Therefore,
There is still some possibility for imperfect spillovers due to idiosyncratic effects, imperfect communication, and so forth. Therefore, there are still spillovers in the industry. The first orders conditions for the social planner are
and ∂Ŵ (q, I)
The FOC with respect to R&D investment says that the social marginal cost of R&D investment has to equal to the total output from the firms resulting from the marginal R&D investment. After some manipulation the output and R&D levels chosen by the social planner at the direct optimum are:
where bγ > n. This is also the result we get from the decentralized economy with the government intervention via tax-subsidy policies. Therefore, the decentralized economy achieves first-best optimum.
Comparison of the Direct Optimum with the Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium is the outcome in which there is no government intervention via tax and subsidy policies. In an unregulated market R&D incentives are deteriorated by the existence of spillovers. The first order conditions for the market equilibrium are as follows.
where
. From (28) we get
From (29),
(30) and (31) characterizes the market equilibrium in I − q space. The first order conditions of the direct optimum are
Equations (32) and (33) characterize the direct equilibrium in the I −q space. It is worth mentioning that equations (31) and (33) define the research intensity in the market equilibrium and direct optimum, respectively.
The first order conditions for the market equilibrium and direct optimum are summarized in Table 1 .
By making use of the two pairs of first order conditions one can get the optimal tax/subsidy policy which we derived before. However, more insight can be gotten from the graphs of these equations (30), (31), (32) and (33) are given in Figure 3 16 . Market equilibrium is characterized by lines KT and OT 0 , and the social optimum is characterized by lines KL and OL 0 . The slope of KL is always greater than the slope of KT . That means the optimal policy towards market power is always to subsidize output. However, the slope of OL 0 is smaller than the slope of OT 0 only if α > 1/(3 + n). In this situation, it is socially optimal to subsidize R&D as shown in Figure 3a . However, if α > 1/(3 + n), the slope of OL 0 is greater than the slope of OT 0 , meaning that a tax on R&D investment is optimal. This situation is shown in Figure 3b . When a firm engages in R&D investment, it is affected twice. First, the production cost reduces due to the cost reducing behavior of R&D investments. Second, the production cost of the other firms decreases due to the spillover effects, which in turn decreases the production cost of the firm in consideration since its profit function is a decreasing function of not only its own cost but also all 16 Figure 3b illustrates the case in which
. That assures social optimum for both R&D and output profiles are bigger that the market equilibrium (
and q S i < q M i . One important point is that the equilibrium level of both R&D investment and output is greater in the social optimum than in the market equilibrium in both of the cases. The market fails to provide the optimal amount of output and R&D investment in the absence of a regulation. the other firms'. However, this second effect, at the same time, decreases the competitive advantage of the firm since it decreases the production cost of all the other firms. Therefore, the investment decision in R&D depends purely on which effect dominates the others. Whenever the spillover effects are high enough, firms collectively choose too low a level of R&D conditional on output compared to the social optimum. Then the system is governed by as shown in Figure 3a and the government should impose an R&D subsidy to fix the externality problem. However, if the spillovers are tiny, it is in firms' best interest to choose collectively too high a level of R&D conditional on output since the positive spillover effect on the firm itself is superfluous. In this case, firms do not have much incentive to free-ride since spillover effects are tiny and thus they are mostly dependent on their own level of R&D investments. In that case they have incentive to over-invest in R&D conditional on every output level to be able to get more competitive advantage. Such a situation is shown in Figure 3b .
An important point is that we can reach to the first best optimum since we have two policies, namely output subsidies and R&D subsidies (or taxes), addressing the two sources of problems in the industry, namely market power and the incentive reducing behavior of spillovers. Therefore, a committed government can achieve Pareto optimality within the standard decentralized competitive market simply by levying proper taxes or subsidies that direct competitive behavior to the correct Pareto optimal conditions.
Conclusion
In this paper we set up a simple model which is quite flexible and useful for analyzing many kinds of public policies towards R&D investments. R&D tax credits can reduce the cost of industrial innovation by providing a rebate through the tax system. However, the controversy over the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives is still considerable. Some empirical studies claimed that R&D tax incentives did not work well. Some others find that R&D tax incentives are indeed effective.
R&D is essentially a public good. If it is priced as though it were a private good, the outcome will be inefficient. There is a well-known externality associated with R&D investment coming through spillover effects which are a source of market failure. Such failures generally cause firms to underinvest in research (or sometimes to over invest due to strategic reasons). Therefore, the market will fail to provide a sufficient amount of R&D. The most direct way to correct this problem is to subsidize (or tax ) the R&D investment.
We set up a simple game-theoretical model to identify the conditions under which tax incentives serve as the means to reach the socially desirable level of privately-financed R&D spending in a regulated oligopolistic industry. It is shown that in the decentralized equilibrium government might want to tax R&D. Here the tax/subsidy policy changes the vector of relative prices in the economy from their values in the market equilibrium to the socially optimal outcomes so as to reach the Pareto efficiency. However, this is more likely to happen when there are a few firms in the industry. We also show that this policy works only if the industry is reasonably concentrated. High concentration is guaranteed by the existence of high R&D investment costs.
One other result is that the optimal R&D subsidy is independent of demand characteristics, the initial marginal cost, and the cost effectiveness of R&D. It depends only on the R&D spillovers and the number of firms in the industry. Therefore, given the number of firms in an industry, the government's intervention is a function of the degree of spillovers.
The reader should keep in mind that our analysis is a partial equilibrium analysis. We neglect the general equilibrium interactions in the economy when the government uses tax/subsidy policies. Therefore, care should be taken in interpreting the conclusions derived from the model. Our aim with this partial equilibrium analysis is to give some insight into the characteristics of R&D tax incentives in oligopolies.
One practical problem with tax incentives is the following. We assume that the government can clearly define what constitutes an investment in R&D, and that the firms do not misreport their R&D investments. In reality, this is not the case. Governments are not able to define R&D activities perfectly, and firms have an incentive to report some other activities as if they were R&D expenditures. Both have been important problems in practice. In an ideal world, the government should determine the sectors that have the highest social rate of return after an extensive cost-benefit analysis. In reality, there is a tendency to reward lobbyists and other influential groups instead of decisions on the basis of cost-benefit analysis.
A Appendix

A1. Third stage
Firm i's profit is given by
Therefore, the FOC is
With a linear demand function of the form p(q i , q i ) = a − b P n k=1 q k , we have
Thus
These equations form a system of n equations in n unknowns. Therefore,
For future reference note that this can be rearranged to get
A2. Second Stage
By substituting for P n k=1 q k and q î
which boils down tô
First order conditions for the second stage of the game is then,
The marginal cost of R&D is (1 − s)Ψ 0 (I i ), which is equal to marginal benefit 2b
Hence,
By using
Define the cost of R&D investment as
After some rearrangement, the reaction function in terms of R&D investments for firm i is given by
Here, the denominator is positive by local stability condition. Since the firms are all the same the stage Nash equilibrium of the second stage of the game is given by
A3. Derivation of Observation 1:
Here, the differentiation of output with respect to R&D investment can be decomposed as follows:
This can also be written in terms of elasticities. Let 
A4. Proof of Proposition 2:
We have already found that s = 
A5. Proof of Proposition 3:
Simple comparison of the decentralized equilibrium's FOC's with the direct optimum FOC's shows that t * = −bq * i where q * i > 0. Therefore, the government subsidizes output.
A6. Proof of Proposition 4:
By looking at the signs of the leading principal minors it is easy to show that SOC requires bnγ − A7. Direct Optimum
The marginal cost function is Φ i (I i , I −i ) = c − (1 − α)I i − α P n k=1 I k . The first order conditions for the social planner are
∂Ŵ (q, I)
From (24) a−b P n k=1 q k −c+(1−α)I i +α P n k=1 I k = 0. From (25) [1+α(n−1)] P n k=1 q k = γ P n k=1 I k .
Solving both together we get na − nb 
A8. Stability Condition
Here, we do not go into details of the stability discussion in Cournot markets, since it is out of the scope of this paper 17 . Instead, we will derive the local stability condition that we need.
The stage Nash equilibrium of the game is locally stable iff ∂ 2Π * i which is exactly the same as the denominator of the equilibrium level of R&D spending. 
A9. Second-Best Optimum
In this case we cannot reach the social optimum but R&D tax result is still preserved. Suppose it is not possible to subsidize output. This can be obtained from our calculations for first-best simply by setting t = 0 in the social welfare function. Then the optimal subsidy in the second-best is as follows:
s SB = 2 − n + (n − 1)(n + 4)α 2 + n + (n + 2)(n − 1)α (A-21)
where SB stands for second-best. It is optimal to tax R&D whenever α < n−2 (n−1)(n+4) . Figure 4 shows the first-best and second-best thresholds at the same graph. First-best threshold is the one shown in Figure 1 and the second-best threshold is the counterpart of it in the second best environment.
In a second-best environment, taxing R&D is optimal anywhere below this curve.
